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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH

]

Plaintiff/Appellee,

]

vs.

]

DAVY GENARO VALENCIANO
Appellate Court No. 20070216-CA
Defendant/Appellant.

'

BRIEF OFAPPELIANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction based upon an Alford plea of guilty by
the Defendant to the charge of Distributing, Offering and/or Arranging to
Distribute a Controlled Substance, a second-degree felony. The plea of guilty
was taken before the Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan on the 10th day of July
2007. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-2(j)
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF
REVIEW
POINT I
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY
PLEA?

1

PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved for
appeal by the timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea (R. 114-115), and
hearings and a ruling on that motion (R. 142/3).
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court reviews "a trial court's denial of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." State
v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993)." The Court applies "the clearly
erroneous standard for the trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction
with that decision." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999).
"However, the ultimate question of whether the trial court strictly complied
with constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a
question of law that is reviewed for correctness." State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d
556, 558 (Utah 1999) (See also State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah
1996)).
POINT II
WAS THE DEFENDANT DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE
1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO
INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE
CASE.

2

PRESERVATION IN THE TRIAL COURT: This issue was preserved for
appeal by the timely filing of a motion to withdraw his plea (R. 114-115), and
hearings and a ruling on that motion (R. 142/3).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The appellate court must determine as a matter of
fact and law whether the Defendant was denied his right to effective assistance
of counsel.

In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S 668, 80 L.Ed.2d 674

(1984), the United States Supreme Court articulated a two part test, which was
adopted in State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), to determine whether
counsel was ineffective. The Court held that;
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed
the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant
must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Id. at 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UNITED STATE CONSTITUTION
Fourth Amendment
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
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Sixth Amendment
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
Fourteenth Amendment
Section. 1. All persons bom or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
Article I, Section 12, [Rights of accused persons]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
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testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to
knowingly
and intentionally;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent,
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
§78-2a-2(j) Court of Appeals Jurisdiction.
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over: cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the
Supreme Court.
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Rule 11(e)
e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) If the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly
waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence, the right
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial before
an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the
prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses,
and that by entering the plea, these rights are waived;
(4) (A) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the burden
5

of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the plea
is an admission of all those elements;
(B) there is a factual basis for the plea. A factual basis is sufficient if it
establishes that the charged crime was actually committed by the defendant or,
if the defendant refuses or is otherwise unable to admit culpability, that the
prosecution has sufficient evidence to establish a substantial risk of conviction;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence, that may
be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including the possibility
of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.
These findings may be based on questioning of the defendant on the record or,
if used, a written statement reciting these factors after the court has established
that the defendant has read, understood, and acknowledged the contents of the
statement. If the defendant cannot understand the English language, it will be
sufficient that the statement has been read or translated to the defendant.
Unless specifically required by statute or rule, a court is not required to
inquire into or advise concerning any collateral consequences of a plea.

SUPREME COURT RULES OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE
UTAH RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.4. Communication.
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to enable
the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

6

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On October 27, 2006, the Defendant was charged with the offense of
Distribution of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a first degree
felony; Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a first
degree felony; and Possession of Paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. On
February 13, 2007, a preliminary hearing was held; and the Defendant was
arraigned on the charges by the Court. (R. 140/59). The Defendant pled guilty
to the amended charge of a simple distribution though an Alford plea.
(R. 141/7). Defendant then filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea based on:
(1) the Defendant felt he was misled regarding the nature of the evidence
against him; (2) the Defendant was not able to see all the evidence against him;
(3) the Defendant felt he was not guilty; (4) the drugs were planted on him by
his wife; and (5) the Defendant had been continually harassed by police
officers. The motion to withdraw his plea was filed on August 8, 2007; and the
Court, after written and oral argument, denied the motion on August 28, 2007,
based upon the Courts determination of a sufficient plea colloquy. (R. 142/4).
On October 9, 2007, Defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term in the
Utah State Prison for one to fifteen years. (R. 143/4). The Defendant filed a
notice of appeal on November 9, 2007. (R. 41).

7

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 27, 2006, the Defendant was charged with the offense of
Distribution of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a first degree
felony in violation of UCA § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iii); Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute, a first degree felony in violation of UCA §
5 8-3 7-8( 1 )(a)(ii); and Possession of Paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor in
violation of UCA § 58-37a-5(l). A preliminary hearing was held on February
13, 2007. (R. 140) The Court found probable cause on all counts, and
Defendant was bound over for trial.
On July 10, 2007, after plea negotiations, Defendant pled guilty to one
amended count of Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a second degree
felony while the other two charges were dismissed. Shortly after entering the
plea, and before sentencing, the Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his plea.
(R. 114-115). Defendant's reasoning for this motion to withdraw his plea was
that he was mislead by his trial attorney, that he did not get to see all of the
evidence against him, and that he was not guilty. (R.l 14-115). The Defendant's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied. (R.l42/4).
At the plea hearing the trial court went through all the elements as set
forth by Rule 11. The court informed the Defendant the possible maximum
sentence that he could receive by pleading guilty (R. 141 19). She asked the
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Defendant if he was "doing this of your own free will and choice?" (R.141/15).
She asked if the Defendant was under the influence of anything that would
affect his judgment. (R.141/15). She informed the Defendant of his right to a
presumption of innocence, and that the burden of proof was on the prosecutor
to prove him guilty of each element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt
(R. 141 / 7). The trial court also told the Defendant that his appeal rights would
be limited by a plea of guilty, and that all the other rights explained would be
forfeited by pleading guilty (R. 141 / 13). The Defendant had reviewed a
statement in advance of plea (R. 141/9), which the Defendant acknowledged
reviewing with his counsel.
The Defendant thereafter filed a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty on
August 8, 2007 (R. 114-115). The Defendant did not file any supporting
memorandum with the motion, and the State filed a two-page objection to the
motion (R. 116-118). The Defendant was then sentenced to a term of
imprisonment not to exceed one to fifteen years on October 9, 2007. (R. 143/4).
At the time of oral argument on the Defendant's motion, his attorney
related that the Defendant believed that there were contradictory evidentiary
issues (R. 143/3). The Defendant later told the Court that at the time of the
plea "I was under drugs... I wasn't in my right mind when I made my
decision." (R. 143/5). Based upon the fact that the trial court had gone through
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the elements set forth under Rule 11, the court denied the Defendant's motion
to withdraw his plea (R. 143 /4).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant argues that under the constitutions of both the state and
federal governments, as well as Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, a Defendant cannot plead guilty if he does not voluntarily and
knowingly enter into the plea agreement. The requirement that a Defendant's
plea must be voluntary has its basis in both constitutional and statutory law, as
well as under the general principle of justice. In the present case the Defendant
believes that these basic guarantees of justice were denied him. The Defendant
had been confused and just before entering the guilty plea, he requested the
Court to present the evidence against him. (R. 141/2). The Defendant pled at the
time of the pretrial conference despite the fact that he was asking for evidence
against him and stated he felt his previous attorney at the preliminary hearing
was not helpful. (R. 141/3)
The Defendant was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance
of counsel by the failure of his appointed counsel to adequately review the
evidence with the Defendant.
While the Defendant acknowledges that the trial court reviewed with
him the rights required under Rule 11, and further acknowledges that he
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reviewed and signed the statement in advance of plea, he believes that his plea
was nevertheless involuntary. The Defendant believes that his plea counsel did
not adequately discuss the State's evidence against him or explain it so he
could understand the evidence. He also was unable to intelligently discuss the
ramifications of pleading guilty versus going to trial with his trial counsel
without this vital information.
The Defendant understands that the Utah Appellate Courts have
presumed that a Defendant has voluntarily entered a plea when the trial court
complies with the required elements of Rule 11. The question as to whether or
not the Defendant understood the evidence against him, however, is uncertain,
when he had asked to hear evidence against him just moments before entering
into the plea. The Defendant is asking this Court to reverse the trial courts
denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, and allow the Defendant to proceed
to trial on the case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW HIS
GUILTY PLEA
On July 10, 2007, the Defendant entered a guilty plea to the seconddegree felony drug charge. On August 8, 2007, the Defendant moved the trial
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court to allow him to withdraw that plea. The trial court thereafter heard
written and oral arguments on the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.
The trial court denied the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.
The Court in the case of State v. Blair, 868 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1993)
held that the appellate court reviews "a trial court's denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard." The Court has
further noted that it applies "the clearly erroneous standard for the trial court's
findings of fact made in conjunction with that decision." State v. Benvenuto,
983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999). "However, the ultimate question of whether
the trial court strictly complied with constitutional and procedural requirements
for entry of a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness."
State v. Benvenuto, 983 P.2d 556, 558 (Utah 1999) (See also State v. Thurman,
911 P.2d 371, 372 (Utah 1996))
Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Criminal procedure provides:
e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or
guilty and mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the
court has found:
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
The trial court, therefore, must ensure that the Defendant is voluntarily
entering his plea, and has a duty to ensure that the Defendant is not being
coerced or pressured in any manner. A trial court abuses its discretion by
failing to grant the motion to withdraw the plea when a Rule 11 violation is
12

present. In the ease of State v. Humphrey, 2003 UT App. 333, % 10, 79 P.3d
960 this Court held:
In the past, we have held that Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure creates "a presumption the plea was entered
voluntarily1' and "good cause exists where the plea was entered
involuntarily." State v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App.
1993). In Thorup, we confirmed that compliance with Rule 11 is
not dispositive in determining a motion to withdraw a plea. A
defendant can show good cause by putting forth evidence that the
plea was in fact involuntary.
In the present case, the Defendant timely filed a motion to withdraw his
plea based on Rule 11 violations of voluntariness.
The Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of Distribution of a
Controlled Substance, a second-degree felony. The Defendant entered into this
plea without fully understanding all of the evidence against him and had
unresolved questions regarding the evidence. The Defendant felt pressured to
enter into the agreement although Defendant believed he was not guilty. The
Defendant did not have the opportunity to discuss with his trial counsel his
concerns about the inconsistent evidence against him despite the fact he had
met with his attorney on two occasions.
In the case of State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 774 (Utah Ct. App. 1990),
the Court ruled that, "[b]oth the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of
Appeals have allowed a Rule 11 challenge to the voluntariness of a plea to be
considered for the first time on appeal."
13

The Utah Supreme Court, in the case of State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d
1266, 1274 (Utah 1988) held "Brady and Hammond1 require that in order for a
plea to be voluntarily and knowingly made, the defendant must understand the
nature and value of any promises made to him." (emphasis added) In the
Copeland decision, the Court remanded the case back to the trial court for
further findings regarding the defendant's mental state and his understanding of
the plea negotiation promises. However, the Court noted:
There are several problems with the plea bargain entered into by
defendant. First, it appears either that he misunderstood the
promise the State made to him regarding its sentencing
recommendation or that the promise was illusory. Second, and
more serious, is the claim that defendant's understanding of the
promise caused him to be misled about the sentencing options
available to the court and therefore the value of the bargain into
which he was entering. (Id. at 1274)
In the present case, the Defendant clearly did not understand the affects
of the plea negotiations. He had asked the Court to show the evidence against
him, despite the fact he had already had a preliminary hearing. Defendant
further brought to the attention of his attorney some inconsistencies regarding
evidence. Defendant then entered into an Alford plea, assuming that because he
was pleading guilty, but not admitting his guilt to the crime, he would have the
opportunity to review the evidence prior to sentencing and withdraw his guilty

1

Brady v. United States, 397 U. S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 742 (1970)
Hammond v. United States, 528 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1975)
14

plea. Admittedly, the trial court asked the Defendant, "do you have any
questions at all?" to which the Defendant stated "no". The trial court also asked
the Defendant if he was entering the plea on his own free will, to which the
Defendant again responded affirmatively. The complicating factor was that the
Defendant felt pressured and felt misled by the very counsel who was supposed
to ensure that no pressure was present and that he understood the evidence
against him.
The Utah Court of Appeals in the case of State v. Norris, 2002 UT App.
305, ^f 11 57 P.3d 238, reversed a defendant's conviction by guilty plea, when
it determined:
Both the trial court and the State clearly promised Norris that
he could pursue a claim for vindictive prosecution on appeal,
but neither the court nor the State could fulfill that promise.
The court's legal error exaggerated the benefits Norris would
receive from pleading guilty. Thus it misled Norris as to "the
nature and value of [the] promise[] made to him." (Quoting
State v. CopelanddX 111 A.)
The Court held: "Thus, Norris's pleas were not made voluntarily with full
knowledge of the consequences of pleading guilty." (Id. at 241)
In the case at bar, the trial court failed to establish the basic requirement
of Rule 11, in that the court did not ensure that the plea was voluntarily taken.
Specifically, the court, knowing that the Defendant had just minutes before
entering into the guilty plea asked to hear the evidence against him and had
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stated to the court that at the time of his preliminary hearing his counsel did not
properly represent him, asked for his motion for discovery. (R. 141/3-4).
Further, Defendant pled guilty to an Alford plea (R. 141/14); and there was not
an adequate record to ensure that the Defendant did in fact "understand the
nature and value of any promises made to him." {State v. Copeland infra
emphasis added).
The Defendant should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea and face
this charge due to his lack of understanding of the evidence against him on the
charge. Before the trial court fulfills its duties in ensuring that the defendant
fully understands the ramifications of his plea, and until this understanding is
guaranteed, the trial court should not allow a plea of guilty to proceed.
POINT II
THE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED HIS RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN VIOLATION
OF THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE
1, SECTIONS SEVEN AND TWELVE OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION BY HIS ATTORNEY'S FAILURE TO
INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE EVIDENCE IN THE
CASE.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."

Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 692 (1984). In Strickland, the
Supreme Court established a two-part test to determine whether counsel's
16

assistance was ineffective.

"First, the defendant must show that counsel's

performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Sfrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at
687, 80L.Ed.2dat693.
In making that assessment, the Court in Strickland v. Washington gave
some guidance in noting: "The proper measure of attorney performance
remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." (Id. at
688) Although the Court in Strickland did not "exhaustively define the
obligations of counsel nor form a checklist for judicial evaluation of attorney
performance" (Id. at 688), it did mention certain minimal requirements. These
duties include, "a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest" as well
as a duty "to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the
defendant informed of important developments in the course of the
prosecution" (Id. at 688) Additionally, the overreaching requirement by the
Supreme Court in ineffective assistance of counsel cases is that the
"performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable
considering all the circumstances." (Id. at 688)
Several other cases more specifically define when a defense counsel's
performance has slipped below the threshold cited above.
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In the case of Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All U.S. 365 (1986) the Court
was presented with a case where defense counsel, due to a failure to conduct
proper discovery, did not timely file a motion to suppress evidence under the
Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction under an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

The Supreme Court affirmed that

reversal. In that affirmation of reversal the Court stated:
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment
claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness,
the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is
meritorious and that there is a reasonable probability that the
verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence
in order to demonstrate actual prejudice. {Kimmelman v.
Morrrison, All U.S. 365, 375 (1986))
In making the determination that trial counsel's conduct failed to comport with
constitutional requirements the Court held:

In this case, however, we deal with a total failure to conduct
pretrial discovery, and one as to which counsel offered only
implausible explanations. Counsel's performance at trial, while
generally creditable enough, suggests no better explanation for
this apparent and pervasive failure to "make reasonable
investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary.11 [citation omitted] Under
these circumstances, although the failure of the District Court and
the Court of Appeals to examine counsel's overall performance
was inadvisable, we think this omission did not affect the
soundness of the conclusion both courts reached — that counsel's
performance fell below the level of reasonable professional
assistance in the respects alleged. {Kimmelman v. Morrrison, All
U.S. 365,386(1986))
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In the case of Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S.Ct 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471, (U.S.
2003), the U.S. Supreme Court found that counsel's failure to investigate the
extensive abuse the defendant had suffered through his life was unreasonable.
The Court reversed his conviction on the grounds that this failure resulted in
defense counsel's inability to present this evidence to the sentencing jury in a
capital case. The Court stated:
We further find that had the jury been confronted with this
considerable mitigating evidence, there is a reasonable
probability that it would have returned with a different sentence.
(Wiggins v. Smith at Point III)
The Utah Appellate Courts have adopted the Strickland test and have
likewise rendered decisions in ineffective assistance of counsel cases that can
guide a determination of when a defense attorney fails in his appointed duties.
In the case of State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the
Court held that the failure of trial counsel to object to a Fourth Amendment
violation constituted reversible ineffective assistance of counsel error. In that
case, the Court applied the Strickland test to a situation where defense counsel
had in a pretrial motion moved to suppress evidence on the basis of an illegal
search. The trial court denied that motion based upon evidence at a preliminary
hearing. During trial the officer altered his testimony establishing the lack of
plain view, yet trial counsel did not re-raise the motion to suppress. The Court
held that "where a defendant can show that there was no conceivable legitimate
19

tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions, the first prong of Strickland is
satisfied.1' (Id. at 976, quoting State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993))
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000), the U.S. Supreme Court
expanded the Stiickland test in certain circumstances. The Court stated:
It is true that while the Strickland test provides sufficient guidance
for resolving virtually all ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims,
there are situations in which the overriding focus on fundamental
fairness may affect the analysis.
In Williams v. Taylor, the Court reversed the defendant's death sentence
on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim where the defense counsel did not
investigate the defendant's "nightmarish childhood", nor the fact that the
defendant was "borderline mentally retarded" (Id. at 395, 396) The Court
concluded that defense counsel unreasonably failed to begin mitigation
investigation until one week prior to trial, and then unreasonably failed to
investigate numerous areas of mitigating evidence that could have benefited the
defendant in the penalty phase.
In the case of State v. Bennett 2000 UT 34, ^ 13, 999 P.2d 1, Justice
Durham, in a concurring opinion noted:
If 13 This court's supervisory power is an inherent power which
has been recognized in many cases. See, e.g., State v. Arguelles,
921 P.2d 439, 442 (Utah 1996) (noting, in ineffective assistance of
counsel case, that "pursuant to our inherent supervisory power
over the courts, we may presume prejudice in circumstances
20

where it is unnecessary and ill-advised to pursue a case-by-case
inquiry to weigh actual prejudice"
In the present case, the representation of the Defendant taken as a whole
was defective, and constitutionally inadequate. First, the Defendant had four
different attorneys. The first two did not show up to court hearings, the third
did not vigorously represent him during the preliminary hearing, and his fourth
counsel allowed him to enter into a plea agreement when counsel knew the
Defendant had questions regarding the nature of the evidence against him and
despite the fact counsel knew that the Defendant believed he was innocent of
the crimes charged. The defense counsel's failure to provide the Defendant
with discovery motions, coupled with the speed in which defense counsel
pushed this matter through to plea, constitutes this inadequacy. The plea was
taken on the same day that the Defendant had just minutes before asked the
Court to hear evidence against him and requested discovery documents.
Rule 1.4 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct governing lawyers
provides in relevant part:
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to
enable the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.
Clearly there was a failure by defense counsel in the present case to properly
comply with these requirements. Defense counsel did not "promptly comply
21

with reasonable requests for information" nor did counsel "explain a matter to
the extent reasonably necessary to enable the client to make informed
decisions."
A defendant should not have to jump into a plea bargain under a cloud of
fear and misunderstanding. If nothing more, plea counsel should adequately
explain the effects of the plea, provide the defendant with relevant reports and
information, and allow the defendant time to digest this information and come
to a reasoned and logical decision devoid of pressure. In the present case this
simply did not occur.
The second prong of the two-part test articulated in Strickland is "the
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693.
In Strickland, the Court held that "[t]he purpose of the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary
to justify reliance on the outcome of the proceeding." In State v. Templin, 805
P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that to meet the second
part of the Strickland test a defendant "must show that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
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proceeding would have been different.

A reasonable probability is a

probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 187
(quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). In making the
determination that counsel was ineffective the appellate court should "consider
the totality of the evidence, taking into account such factors as whether the
errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an isolated effect and how
strongly the verdict is supported by the record." Id.
Clearly, in the present case, if defense counsels had spent the appropriate
time discussing the case with his client, and providing him with requested
discovery documents concerning his case, and informing him the difficulty to
withdraw a plea despite the fact it was an Alford plea, the plea would not have
been entered. This meets the second prong of the Strickland test in that "the
result[s] of the proceeding would have been different."
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully asks this Court to
reverse the trial courts denial of his motion to withdraw his plea and allow him
to proceed to trial on the case.
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COP

P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

State of Utah versus Davy Valenciano,

61904066.
Let me just first say that I realize that there's
been a motion to withdraw the plea, but the State has
responded to it already.

I took it upon myself simply to go

ahead and review the tape that I -- of the -- of the plea
that I had taken.

I've reviewed the State's response.

I've

reviewed what was filed, and I'm prepared to go ahead and
just handle that today.
MR. BOUWHUIS:
MR. LYON:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.
Is there any argument on that motion?

I

realize you -- that you filed it, Mr. Bouwhuis, on behalf of
Mr. Valenciano.

The State has responded, and I'm not sure

anything else is going to be, you know, particularly
but

helpful

—
MR. BOUWHUIS:

Right.

And I talked to

Mr. Valenciano about it, and he -- the only thing he had to
say m

addition was just to expound on a couple of the

evidentiary problems, but that -- that doesn't change
THE COURT:

—

If you want to do that, that's fine, but

it's -MR. BOUWHUIS:

Well, he just indicated that there

was an item of evidence regarding which room he was found

m

2

and whic h room he was supposed to have come from.

He

indicates there's a contradiction in the reports on tha t and
also inclicates the receipt supposedly showing that he h ad
rented the room they thought he was in didn't have his
signature on it.

And so those were evidentiary issues that

he felt should have been attacked.
THE COURT:
MR. LYON:

Anything from the State?
We'll submit it on the brief.

THE COURT:

Okay.

The brief was filed by the State.

I think that properly states the current status of the law,
that if the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered and
there were no Rule 11 violations, there's no basis for
withdrawing the plea.
I'm going to deny your motion to withdraw the plea.
I was particularly interested in reviewing the tape to make
sure that everything had been done properly.

And not only

did you read the statement in support of the guilty plea, you
acknowledged that you read and understood it, you -- you -- I
also went through in great detail what your rights were in
addition to what was stated in the -- in the statement in
support of a guilty plea which had been read to you by
Mr. Bouwhuis.
I indicated to you that you could file a motion to
withdraw your plea but it was highly unlikely that I was
going to grant it if you entered a plea of guilty that day

3

because I felt that after we had gone through it, I had

|

answered all your questions, you had had an ample opportunity
to make a decision about whether you wanted to do this.

I

specifically stated to you are you sure this is what you, in
fact, want to do.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Your Honor --

You said that you did, and I'm going to

deny your motion to withdraw the plea.
voluntarily.

It was clearly done

You knew what you were doing.

I'm convinced of

that, and I'm not going to let you withdraw it, just as I
indicated I wasn't going to absent some showing that we had
done something wrong at that time.
I don't think I could have done any more in terms of
taking the plea in terms of informing you what your rights
were, gave -- giving you ample opportunity to change your
mind if you wanted to do that.

I was certain after talking

with you at that date that that's, in fact, what you chose to
do.

You voluntarily entered your plea.
THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

And --

Can I say something?

Well, I'm -- you've just had your

attorney speak for you.

I've reviewed the motion.

I'm going

to deny your motion, and I'm ready to go ahead with
sentencing, and I -- you know, I realize you may have
something to say with regard to sentencing, but that's fine.
You can say that.

But as far as withdrawing your plea, I'm

4

1

I not going to allow you to do that.

2

|

MR. BOUWHUIS:

I didn't get a presentence report.

I

got a -4

I

THE COURT:

There wasn't one done because he refused

5

I to give a --

6

|

MR. BOUWHUIS:

7

|

THE COURT:

Okay.

-- statement.

So I'm ready to go ahead

with -9

|

THE DEFENDANT:

I didn't refuse anything, Your

10

| Honor.

I just told them I wasn't -- I had changed my plea

11

| and I (inaudible) speak to my attorney.

12

I

THE COURT:

13

Right.

THE DEFENDANT:

I wanted to speak to him before I

14

did anything.

15

case has been messed up.

16

that.

17

to when I've got my head on straight.

18

that day and everything.

19

made my decision.

20

I didn't deny anything, and I -- this whole
I was under drugs.

I was under all

You can see by the picture the way I look now compared
I know what went on

I wasn't in my right mind when I

You can see --

THE COURT:

That's not what you stated in your

21

motion to withdraw your plea, and I specifically asked you at

22

the time I took your plea all those questions.

23

going to go back --

24
25

THE DEFENDANT:
that's what happened.

So we're not

I sent you a letter saying I
I sent you personally saying I

—

wasn't -- I was under a lot of stress.

Personally I sent you

a letter when I got incarcerated.
THE COURT:
plea.

I'm not going to let you withdraw your

This case has been going on and -THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

No --

THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Yeah, but it's not my fault --

-- it's been going on.

-- just a minute.

THE DEFENDANT:

It's not just me making

judgments

and setting court dates.
THE COURT:

Let's go ahead -- I'm willing to go

ahead with sentencing today.

I'm not sure a presentence

report is going to be all that helpful anyway, given the
facts of this case and given the charge and given the
defendant's guilty plea to it.
So, Mr. Bouwhuis, do you want to go ahead with
anything?
MR. BOUWHUIS:

Well, I guess the challenge I have is

I don't have a presentence report.
record is.

I don't know what his

I don't know the standard things that we would

have with a presentence report regarding his background,
employment, the family, substance abuse history, and whatnot,
so I'm not really prepared on this.
MR. LYON:
discretion.

We'll leave it to Your

Honor's

The State's -- I've had a chance to briefly

6

review his criminal record.

I think it's a prison -- I think

it should be a prison recommendation, but we'll leave it to
Your Honor's discretion.
THE COURT:

Well, you know, I suppose to avoid any

problem in the future I'll get a presentence report.

I'm not

sure it's going to be helpful because, frankly, dealing drugs
is a prison offense as far as I'm concerned -THE DEFENDANT:
THE COURT:

Your Honor --

-- especially in a case like this.

get a presentence report.

That's the end of that.

I'll

Okay?

I'm reluctant to do it, but I'll do it because I don't want
any criticism later on so -PROBATION OFFICER:
THE COURT:

October 9th, Your Honor.

October 9th at 2:00 o'clock you'll be

sentenced on this charge.
THE BAILIFF:

Let's go.

THE DEFENDANT:
THE BAILIFF:

Speak to him?
Nope.

MR. BOUWHUIS:
THE COURT:

Let's go.

Thank you, Your Honor.

Thank you.

(End of proceedings.)
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